

CONFLICTS IN PAKISTAN – THE NEED FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE

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ABSTRACT

For human development and the eradication of poverty, good governance is important as it shapes a well-operating state service that observes the norms of openness, accountability, responsibility, and commitment to citizens. It constitutes an efficient and responsible governance of public resources that eliminates corrupt practices and ensures that public funds are used in respect of the constitutional provisions, for the good of all citizens. Good governance, while keeping leaders accountable, ensures an appreciation of legal, cultural, economic, political, and social rights. Good governance and human progress are also interconnected. While identifying deep rooted conflicts in Pakistan, this study relates the required components of good governance in Pakistan, while outlining its challenges. The study states that bad governance has produced social unrest, and political and economic instability in Pakistan. This paper presents several recommendations for addressing Pakistan's problems related to bad governance, while explaining the principle of good governance.

Keywords: good governance, Pakistan, economics, social unrest, politics.

INTRODUCTION

Conflict means a situation of tension triggered by the divergence of interests, beliefs, and desires, either intentional or unintentional (Mustafa, 2013). Conflicts occur when different parties (two or more) feel that their interests are conflicting (Sandole, 1995) and thus they demonstrate aggressive attitudes towards one another or take some action that harms the other party's chance to obtain their due rights (Moghaddam & Harré, 2010). Pakistan is a conflict-affected country, where several regions are under various types of conflicts. However, these conflicts are strongly rooted and multidimensional in Pakistan. Most of the issues in Pakistan

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are linked to the principles of social and economic control, which are mostly worsened by domestic level governance control and influenced by important stakeholders. Even so, these issues are local to the government and are the product of challenges that have lingered unanswered since the country's formation; to solve these issues requires economic and political strategies. On the other hand, some of the issues have both a geographic as well as a global dimension.

Just after the independence of Pakistan in 1947, many individuals were directly impacted, the very first real struggles having occurred in the form of communal riots. Even before the independence of the country, years of conflicts persisted between Hindus, Muslims, and the British authorities in the subcontinent. Pakistan has faced several other types of conflicts, based on cultural, racial, and religious struggles, following its creation in 1947 (Mustafa, 2013). In 1971, yet another war, with a nationalist backing, divided the eastern side of Pakistan, leading to the formation of Bangladesh. Nationalism-fuelled resentments have also been raising concern in Balochistan province, following the independence of Pakistan. Over the years, conflicts have become extremely serious and have now reached catastrophic dimensions. Consequently, from time to time, various conflicts surfaced in Pakistan, and these turned violent after 9/11, when Pakistan joined hands with the US powers in the name of 'War against Terrorism.'

On several occasions, Pakistan has been ranked among the hardest affected nations, due to a series of conflicts. The continuing, increased levels of violent conflicts did not lead though to a serious attention being paid to those conflicts or to some adequate political consensus. The main characteristics of these conflicts are: civilian casualties, financial crash, serious threats to the cultural and social structure in its various regions, and political unrest – as well as distrust amongst the parties in the „war against terrorism” (PIPS, 2010). In Pakistan, violence has started to be recognized as a part of normal life. While scholars have conducted conflict studies, such as an analysis of the particular factors of the conflict, public, governmental policies continued to be a challenge. Pakistan has been experiencing extreme challenges in the name of sectarian violence, nationalism, but also as a result of national as well as international politics, economic inequality, and drug wars. Furthermore, other terrorist networks in almost all regions of the country, and especially in Balochistan, Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), and Provincially Administered Tribal Area (PATA) proved to be a challenge to the country's stability. For its citizens, as well as for the social structure, violence becomes a massive burden since it has serious structural, domestic, and international implications (Mustafa & Mumtaz, 2010).

This paper seeks to analyse the long history of conflicts in Pakistan and their impact on the overall structure of the society, under a governance studies theoretical framework. Its purpose is to build the way forward to bring up resolutions which will eventually address the culture of impunity in the society. The importance of the study resides in its intention of identifying the dynamics that

are disturbing the cohesion of Pakistani society, to better understand the core roots of conflicts and how they expanded – while putting forward as a priority some new ways for good governance.

CONFLICT AND ITS EFFECTS ON SOCIETY

‘Conflicts’ have devastating long term effects on economic and social aspects of all societies. Prevention is always better than treatment, it always costs more to address the conflict-related consequences. Also, conflict leads to overt and implicit damage (Mustafa, 2013). The main risks include loss of civilian life, loss of livestock / animals, damage to public resources, collapse of buildings and equipment, harm to housing developments, automobiles and other state belongings, budgetary expenses for war and costs of maintaining law and order, and also the loss of natural resources. Large scale conflicts have a detrimental effect on investments, either local or global. Massive expenses on physical and mental health facilities and community resettlement were the outcome of some conflicts. There is a detrimental impact of conflicts on earning capacity, on travel and tourism, and so on. Disability has a detrimental effect on potential earnings, hospitality, and the drop in tourist arrival, among other things. The indirect costs of conflict and violence include: the disruption of the social structure, the increase of gender violence, the loss of productivity attributable to conflicts or threats of violence. It also decreases trading and commerce, due to violence or security risks, leads to a loss of opportunities for education, to massive unemployment (due to overseas migration of skilled workers) etc. Other notable economic and financial risks are: inflation, increased joblessness, rising market interest rate, decreased economic activity, increasing welfare costs, delays in initiating development programs that would consequently lead to delays in production and to a rising cost of development (Mustafa & Mumtaz, 2010; Mustafa, 2013). Due to uncertain situations, there is a considerable capital loss and also a brain drain from the region. Other consequences of conflict are declining domestic trade, rising debt, high loan rates, high costs for rescue relief, restoration and recovery of affected regions, social and emotional damages, environmental destruction, and so on.

As stated by Robert Jervis (1991), while huge violence remained a choice and states seemed to worry about maintaining their stability, as the character of violence would change in time. Research on international security is required to gain a better and wider knowledge of the causes of massive violent activities, the methods that could be used and the strategies that could be exercised to reduce this hostility (Herman, 1999). Crippling effects of massive violence on human life demand the community of international development to reconsider its duties to peace and protection (OECD, 2001). Thus, it is necessary to learn to deescalate hostile situations and to create harmony between individuals. Efficient interaction

among individuals is not arm-based. Awareness about conflict, violence as contributing factors in Pakistan must be created through communication strategies and discourses. Though conflicts in Pakistan are a risk to the economy, to social order, and to the politics of the country, unfortunately, there is a scarcity of analytical work that has been done in this regard. The need and significance of research on the subject has also been identified by a few of the previous studies (Aziz, 2010; Matinuddin, 2009; ICG, 2005). Also, in their studies, Mustafa & Mumtaz (2010), Malik (2011) and Nasir *et al.* (2011) examined the indicators of terrorism in a few countries of South Asia, including Pakistan. Politics and the economy of the country were identified as the root cause for violence in the country. Also, Humphreys (2003), Mejia (2004) and Ra & Singh (2005) assessed conflict in terms of its economic cost and also its effect on social development and growth.

An understanding of the 'conflict determinants' is aimed towards making the officials to focus more on resolving the conflict. Identifying the roots of conflict can make policy formulation simpler, which would further lead to conflict resolution. This paper seeks to discuss a few major conflicts in the country. It also intends to devise policy proposals for the mitigation of violent conflicts and their effects on the region. The study is structured in three parts, following this introduction. This segment of the article covers an overview of the important, contextual aspects of violent conflicts in Pakistan. The upcoming three chapters will discuss the violent, deep-rooted conflicts in the country, the concept of governance during conflicts, and the way forward for good governance in Pakistan to curtail the violent situations.

This study is conducted based on secondary data such as previous literature, national and international surveys on Pakistani economics, on poverty, and on conflicts (such as The World Bank, East Asia Forum, Gallup Pakistan, and PIPS).

GEO-POLITICAL SITUATION IN PAKISTAN

Pakistan is at the centre of central, southern, and western Asia, giving the country a geostrategic significance. For all the landlocked Central Asian countries, this fastest link to the sea greatly strengthens its strategic significance. There are plenty of mineral resources in Central Asian countries, attracting the world's powerful countries to build their position in the region. Based on the various economic and political influences in the region, the national and international parties have invested their finance and other types of support to achieve their ultimate goals. This has enabled non-state institutions to develop and improve their positions in the region. This entire situation has made the country vulnerable and has led to internal tensions. Political economy literature indicates that political and economic agendas of the international donors from powerful interest groups discourage economic growth and development, while relying on assistance from

other countries. Pakistan is not only a developing country, but it is one of the top five receivers of international aid, which is strongly showing the presence of foreign investors in the country.

Seventy-five years now since the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the country still struggles with its own domestic challenges, on social, political, and economic grounds, but has lately leased to also deal with an extremely troublesome action plan: the war conducted by the international powers against extremism, the domestic influence over its foreign affairs and the persistence of Islamist terrorism, which is deeply connected with some aspects of globalization, such as global security and economy. The strategic status of Pakistan is challenging. There are major risks to the western country's economic interests in Pakistan. In a global market, countries such as Pakistan are facing a series of problems with regards to partnerships, intangible assets and, most importantly, with their human capital. If a challenge is implicit or explicit, it is important for the organizational risk management to be familiar with the environment wherein they operate or have yet to access. Being aware of the potential risks helps one predict the result of such incidents, leading to a decision process that would emerge to prevent or minimize the risks most efficiently.

CONFLICTS IN PAKISTAN

MILITANCY

In more than a decade, the 'extremism epidemic' has been viewed as something that has dramatically affected not just the landscape of global peace, stability, economies, and politics, but has also posed a threat to Pakistan's survival. Not only has Pakistan's position as a frontline state disrupted its economic system, but it has also plagued a huge collateral damage and created a sense of vulnerability among the public (Ahmad, Mahsud, & Ishtiaq, 2011). The economic growth was halted. Inflation, which is rising, has forced millions of people just under the poverty threshold. With regards to social living, Pakistani society has faced severe, irreversible losses (Bhattacharya, 2018).

It is reported that more than 40,000 Pakistanis, which include 5,000 security forces, have lost their lives in the US fight against terrorism. And that there is still no end to this violent extremism which is the disturbing and troubling part of all these struggles of the Pakistanis (Javaid & Ali, 2013). Hence, the country is confronted with two main fractions of terrorism, one which is internal and another one, external; these were specifically identified as the two simultaneous challenges of Islamic fundamentalism and ethnic violence. The prime security concern stems mainly from the "inside" issues. Banned groups, with deep ethnic and religious bias, have creating the internal terrorism. This type of terrorism has severely

affected several regions of the country such as Kuram, Para Chinar, Dera Ismail Khan, the southern Punjab, FATA, and Balochistan.

Suicide bombings and attempts targeting buildings, schools, banks, transportation systems and power stations are a few examples of such locally sourced violence. International terrorism activities are more like to be attacks on strong targets in Pakistan, and this list would include attacks on the dignitaries of the country, foreigners, Army headquarter, Naval base, and air strikes on other security centres. As a mechanism of government strategy, these missions are funded by agents of the state (Irshad, 2011). The multi-dimensional chaos resulting from several extremist and militant organizations inside the country has a special dynamic and an overwhelming effect on the nation. The Talibanization¹ phase has drastically distorted the existence of Pakistan (Bhattacharya, 2018). Pakistan's political instability and absence of a sovereign government has given enough space to these terrorist organisations and their parent fundamentalist groups to claim their superiority in the country and use the ensuing political leverage they have got (Bhattacharya, 2016).

SECTARIAN CONFLICT

One of the serious threats to Pakistan's domestic peace and security is the sectarian conflict. The rise in Pakistan's sectarian tensions can be traced back to the days of Zia-ul-Haq². The Shias³ were strongly in opposition to the implementation process of Zakat⁴ on the entire nation. It was assumed to be a step-in order to respond to the 1979 Iranian Revolution⁵ which had undoubtedly generated a religious conscience among the entire Shiite community of the country. Even though Zia eventually excluded the Shias from Zakat, the very first seeds of the Sunni and Shia sectarian strife were planted (Schmidt, 2012). Established in 1979,

¹ It refers to the practices of (Taliban) extremists and especially to those of terrorist and religious groups. Maya Chadda, "Talibanization of Pakistan's Transitional Democracy," *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues* 3, no. 3 (1999): p. 98–116.

² He was Chief of Army Staff and the 6th president of Pakistan, starting 1977. Lawrence Ziring, "Public Policy Dilemmas and Pakistan's Nationality Problem: The Legacy of Zia ul Haq," *Asian Survey* 28, no. 8(1988): p. 795–812.

³ There are two branches of Islam, Shia and Sunni. They have primarily different views on Islam and its teachings. Elizabeth Chuck, "What are the differences between Sunni and Shiite Muslims," *NBCNews*, 2016.

⁴ Zakat is an Islamic term, which means to purify your wealth. It is a type of donations that is regarded as a religious duty in Islam. Muhammad Abdullah, Abdul Qudus, "The impact of Zakat on social life of Muslim society," *Pakistan Journal of Islamic Research*, no. 8 (2011): p. 85–911.

⁵ This revolution is also known as the *Islamic revolution*, which was supported by Islamist and leftist organizations and student movements. Through this civil resistance, Iran became an Islamic republic by taking over Pahlavi dynasty. Roger Homan, "The origin of the Iranian revolution", *International Affairs* 56, no. 4(1980): p. 673–677.

the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh Jafaria (TNFJ)⁶ offered Shias a portal to communicate their political viewpoint in Pakistan. The US-funded War in Afghanistan to suppress the Soviets also brought a new driving force to the sectarian strife within Pakistan, due to the large amount of donations received from the Middle East countries under the pretext of ‘Afghan relief’. These donations have been used largely to finance different sectarian initiatives.

In 1985, the Sunni counterpoint to TNFJ as Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)⁷ was established by an Islamist named Haq Nawaz Jhangvi⁸, who belonged to a Siraiki region of Punjab province. The SSP strived to demonize the Shiite community. This has the potential to take root in the Seraiki belt, owing to the strong opposition of a large proportion of Sunni population to the affluent Shiite tribal landlords who dominate the region’s economics and politics. (Schmidt, 2012). The southern region of Punjab has emerged into a breeding ground of Sectarian conflict in Pakistan. Soon after its establishment, in the context of declaring Pakistan a formally Sunni state and identifying Shias as non-Muslims, the SSP has started targeting the local Shia community. Throughout the years, the movements of SSP have expanded in an alarming way to other regions of the country where former Shia-Sunni conflicts have been deeply seated, such as in Quetta, Peshawar and FATA’s Kurram Agency. Since then, SSP and its more extreme armed wing Lashkar e Jhangvi (LeJ)⁹ began targeting Christians and Ahmedis (Lieven, 2011). Later, the more extreme organization was established by Shias of Thokar Niaz Beg, Lahore in the name of Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP)¹⁰ (Rana, 2004). The violent anti-Shia clashes in Lahore, from 1986, followed by the assassination of Allama Ehsan Elahi Zaheer¹¹ in 1987, a Saudi-backed Sunni scholar, and the assassination of Shia leader Arif Hussaini¹² in 1988,

⁶ The Shia militant movement was initiated through this organization against the then president of Pakistan, General Zia ul Haq, in 1979. Also, the Iranian revolution of 1979 created the foundations and support for this Shia organization. A. Hyder, *The politicization of the Shias and the development of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria in Pakistan*, Routledge, 1993, p.19.

⁷ Sunni militancy movement was initiated as a counter-response of Shia organization. Because Sunni and Shia are two branches of Islam, following separate Islamic teachings. “Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan”, *Mapping Militant Organizations*, Stanford University.

⁸ He was a Sunni priest who initiated SSP and started accusing Iranian revolution. He was killed by anonymous militants in 1990. Biexas Lionel, “Jhangvi (?-1990) Maulana Haq Nawaz”, *Mass Violence and Resistance*, 2008. .

⁹ It is an auxiliary of SSP, also an Islamist organization initiated in the name of Jihad, bisted among top terrorist groups. “Lashkar-e-Jhangvi”, *Mapping Militant Organizations*, Stanford University.

¹⁰ Another Shia militancy organization which is also banned due to its terrorist actions. Arif Rafiq, “Pakistan’s Resurgent Sectarian War,” *United States Institute of Peace*, 2014.

¹¹ He is recognized in the history of Pakistan for his severe remarks and actions against Muslims other than Sunnis. He was killed in a bomb blast. Derrick M. Nault, *Development in Asia: Interdisciplinary, Post-neoliberal, and Transnational Perspectives*, Brown Walker Press., 2008, p. 276.

¹² Known as Khomaini e Pakistan, he mobilized the Shia community. He was assassinated outside a local mosque. His funeral was attended by leading figures of Iran and Pakistan. M. Lodhi, “Pakistan’s Shia movement: an interview with Arif Hussaini,” *Third World Quarterly* 10, no. 2 (1988): p. 806–817.

were the beginning of sectarian violence in the country. With the establishment of LeJ in 1996, the circumstances grew increasingly destructive in the mid-1990s. Workers of LeJ originated from marginal unemployed people of the south Punjab. In the following years, the US State Department listed LeJ on its terrorist list of 2003 (Hussain, 2007).

Both Sunnis and Shias have been decreed as political parties in Pakistan, one as Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)¹³ and SSP, and the other as TNFJ and SMP. In addition, the hostility and resentment of Shia-Sunni have turned into violent conflicts that have taken large numbers of innocent lives (Shah, 2014). In the 1980s, the SSP, which now operates under the banner of Ahl-e Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), established basic training connections with al-Qaeda. The strife expanded farther in the 1990s, when LeJ executed its operations from a safe refuge in Afghanistan through which it plotted violent actions to take place in Pakistan (Rafiq, 2014). The worsening unrest in the West Asian region is also strengthening Pakistan's sectarian ideology. Although the Pakistani government is shifting towards the Gulf Arab Sunni centre, jihadists based in Pakistan are increasingly concentrating their attention on Iran (Rafiq, 2014). Shia Hazaras are constantly attacked in the name of sectarian tensions in Quetta. Also, Pakistan has become a frontline in the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia from the perspective of a sectarian dispute in the region.

BALUCHISTAN CONFLICT

One of the major conflict factors in Pakistan's domestic affairs is the Balochistan situation. With a total area of 347,190 km, it is the largest of all provinces in the country. There are rich mineral resources in the province, particularly energy resources, such as natural gas and oil reserves, of an approximate 19 trillion cubic feet and of 6 trillion barrels respectively (Alamgir, 2012). In the district of Chagai, Reko Diq, Balochistan also has gold and copper reserves. The strategic value of accessing the sea has generated more issues. Its port in Gwadar connecting Pakistan with Iran and NATO supply routes have increased its significance with respect to Pakistan's relations with the US and China. The ongoing phase of rebellion has become a form of resistance by the Baloch natives, who do not acknowledge the Federal government of Pakistan. They are also classified into different groups headed by influential Baloch Sardars (leaders) who are not willing to accept the Pakistani state. The history of Balochistan is one of unceasing resistances and tyrannies. In the case of Balochistan, it is said that there have already been five rebellion movements in the

¹³ Established by Islamic clerics of Sunni community; it has recognition in KPK and Balochistan. It is also split into other groups. Jamiat Ulema e Islam, PakPedia, 2018.

province since 1947. The region experienced an initial wave of resistance in 1948, followed by those in 1955, when Ayub Khan¹⁴ imposed 'One Unit' program¹⁵, the third rebel movement happening during the Martial Law period, in 1958; the dismissal of Balochistan Chief Minister Sardar Attaullah Mengal by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1973 led to the fourth rebellion, and the fifth and current phase of clashes started in 2005, when the conflict rose between the Bugti clan under the leadership of Nawab Mohammad Akbar Khan Bugti and the government authorities (Pildat, 2012). The Baloch national resistance has a double meaning from both ends of the Goldsmid Line¹⁶. The issue of armed resistance cannot be and must never be addressed unilaterally. Instability and ethnic differences are experienced by Balochs on both ends of the border. Still, most of the Balochis do not stretch their nationalism further than their allegiance to the tribe.

Marri, Bugti, and Mengal are the three major tribes in the province. The leaders of these tribes are responsible for growing huge numbers of army and weapons, and even then, they remain extremely insecure with each other (Kucecz, 2012). The history of the province is mostly about plentiful mineral wealth, disturbing ethnic minorities, and the incessant oppression by the government. The Baloch concerns are linked to years of ethnicity-based repression and eventual demographic shifts, with a rising Pashtun community and the lack of access to the mineral wealth by the Baloch population. Baloch militants fight for Balochistan to be an autonomous nation. They do not accept Pakistan as a country. The Balochis complain about the 'imposed' adoption of the identity of Pakistan in order to have control from within to its resources. The Baloch uprising and the oppression of Pakistan have taken countless human lives throughout the last few decades.

More importantly, the ethnic conflict in Balochistan is now known for its 'torture and kill' missions. The conflict emerged with a series of incidents throughout the creation of the country. Thus, these extremism roots in the province challenge its social cohesion and democracy. Militant parties such as Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Baloch Republican Army (BRA), Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) and others frequently operate against the government. In addition, Balochistan has been under greater scrutiny following 2009, by the US claiming that Quetta and its surrounding areas are a refuge for the Talibanization. The US also keeps a tight control on the Quetta Shura (Siddiqi, 2012). Notably, a meeting on Balochistan, led by Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, was held on 9th February 2012 by the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the United States,

¹⁴ He was the second President of Pakistan and the 5-star General in Pakistan Army. W.M. Dobell, "Ayub Khan as President of Pakistan," *Pacific Affairs* 42, no.3 (1969): p. 294–310.

¹⁵ It was initiated to run administration issues between the two unbalanced states of East and West Pakistan. R. Singh, "One Unit Scheme of Pakistan, 1955–1970 revisited", *South Asia Journal*, 2018.

¹⁶ Which is between Iran and Pakistan and Durand line of Pak-Afghan border. Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, *Boundary Politics and International Boundaries of Iran*, Universal Publishers, 2007, p. 372.

House of Representatives Committee on International Affairs. In Balochistan, other terrorist organizations (such as LeJ, Taliban, Jundullah, also called the Iranian People's Resistance Movement), have been involved. The Balochistan conflict has been taken to the assembly of one of the most influential countries in the world which indicated an average development was not met (Siddiqi, 2012).

ETHNIC CONFLICT

Pakistan is made up of multiple ethnicities dispersed through the territory and with specific regional traditions. Neither can these traditions be recognized as per Islamic law, nor as non-Islamic (Akbar, 2015). There are numerous factors being blamed for Pakistan's ethnic tensions. In Pakistan, the commonly held view is that the state is not racially moderate, and the Punjabi is the leading linguistic community. The military institution is the primary focus where this dominance is most obvious, particularly at the highest levels (Samad, 2013). The Punjabis have been overrepresented in the state structure and non-representative structures such as military and civil service, and in sectors such as finance, trade, and industry – and this is one of the reasons for their relatively high social and political status. In addition, the provinces that make up Sindh, KPK, FATA and Balochistan face racial wrath and conflicted identity because of British colonialism of delineating foreign boundaries without considering the local viewpoint and realities. The division of the subcontinent also added its own stake to Pakistan's ethnic conflicts, with mainland Indian emigrants claiming a corresponding part in Sindh (Bhattacharya, 2016). As discussed above, ethnic wars are also experienced in other parts of the country, not just in Balochistan. Karachi, the country's business hub, is also seen as a boiling pot for many ethnicities, living in the city, in search of food and shelter. Thus, the ethnic dispute has taken an urban shape in the context of Mohajirs (migrated Indians) competing with Pashtuns and Sindhis. Terrorism and instability linked to ethnic strife have severely affected economic activities in urban Sindh, where there has been reports of capital outflows to other areas, diffidence towards foreign investment, billions of rupees being wasted every year due to frequent disruptions (Ahmed, 1996).

Karachi, which is considered the heart of the turf war, has experienced, over a period, the incremental migration of the Pashtuns and their hegemony in the private transportation industry (Mushtaq, 2009). It is a fact that, since 1947, Karachi has been the recipient of four mass waves of migrants: The Mohajirs during the 1940s and 50s, Punjabis and Pathans throughout the 1960s and the 80s, Sindhis from the 1970s to 90s and also outsiders such as Afghans, Iranians, Iraqis, Ethiopians, Sri Lankans, Bangladeshis, Burmese, Thais and Philipinos in the 1980s and 90s (Waseem, 1996). The inflow of multi-ethnic immigrants into Karachi has led to the language and culture alienation of the Sindhi community in Karachi.

Unfortunately, due to interior relocation (some from Punjab and KPK), the proportion of Punjabi and Pashtun also expanded in Karachi, attempting to make Balochi and Sindhi a marginalized culture in the city (Budhani, Gazdar, Kaker, & Mallah, 2010). Thus, it can be noted that the biggest city of Pakistan is severely split between various cultural differences and deeply affected by violent acts and gang rivalries that destabilize the social system. Ethnic conflicts among young people are widespread in Karachi and Quetta. There are rampant target killings of representatives of different ethnicities and these mass killings are being undertaken by the young “revolutionaries” of these parties. For instance, students’ wings of the MQM, the Awami National Party (ANP), the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), and the Sindhi nationalists have been fighting in Karachi and the interior side of Sindh. Balochistan’s separatist students and youth wings of nationalist parties attack the non-Balochis in Balochistan (Zaman & Sabir, 2013).

STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS

Pakistan’s problems have a strong societal foundation. The official mechanisms of the state are integrated in the societal structure, and the borders between the public and private sectors are permeable in Pakistan. Pakistani leadership at all stages is more prone to gain legitimate power using social networks and influence, instead of earning it through clean, transparent practices. Governance mechanisms and policies are frequently misunderstood by officials at the regional level, and administrators exploit their status by imposing barriers that restrain data accessibility, social utilities, or paperwork. This encourages and facilitates the system’s informality since individuals (especially the poor and disadvantaged) must depend on brokers, close connections, or settlement systems such as bribe to enter the system or benefit from the public services. Many critical areas of administration and law lack the necessary legislative measures, regulations, and processes to make them effective or even functional. For example, the incompetence and reluctance to draw out the necessary procedures for its enforcement has hindered the efficacy of the Freedom of Information Ordinance of 2002. This inability to provide enforcement mechanisms to the law is attributed, partly, to a limited capacity, especially when considering the government’s several concurrent initiatives. Nevertheless, it might also be the result of a basic commitment to the policies themselves. The government at all stages seems to be having trouble distributing the budget allotted to essential facilities (such as education and healthcare), despite the fact that these areas are already poorly resourced. Thus, a province like Sindh seems to spend less on their education than other provinces. And this failure to invest is due to both poor services at federal level and insufficient capability to handle funds at the regional and local levels. Public perceptions of electoral institutions and provision of public services reflect

both profound skepticism and poor morale. For instance, Pakistan has one of the lowest voter turnout scores worldwide (Mezzera & Aftab, 2009). The public show minimal trust in the government system. Thus, people are inclined to seek informal methods of justice and service delivery, regardless of the fact that they are governed by and support local authorities.

Also, the state's existence is considerably more challenging in regions neighboring Afghanistan, where public services have mostly been usurped by military intervention and suppression (Mezzera & Aftab, 2009). For instance, in Balochistan province, where the whole public service and organizational framework appears to exist in theory, two considerations should be made: firstly, several higher official positions in Balochistan remain unfilled due to a lack of competent staff, and secondly, even though positions are not vacant, administrators deployed in the province frequently do not report to work. This is because many of these officers are stationed in remote regions, away from their homes and families. This is not specific only to Balochistan; it also happens in the rural regions of other provinces. In the context of FATA, there seems to be a clear difference between the circumstances before and following the onset of military operations in 2003. Prior to 2003, the region had a government system in the shape of highly strong Political Agencies, and also public service personnel from the departments of Education and Health care. One of the FATA agencies also established a higher education training institution, for health staff and faculty development. After 2003, the environment shifted, and a major portion of the education systems and health care facilities was closed due to the conflict and fears of kidnapping of civil servants, too. Furthermore, security operations in FATA and some areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province have always generated discussions about the importance of providing transitional legal systems for conflict-affected communities. Thus, the major focus seems to be the necessity to preserve peace in post-conflict regions, with little discussion on how important would be to provide reconciliation and restitution measures to the afflicted community.

Pakistani nation lacks a functional democracy in a range of matters. People, mainly the poor and women, lack institutional mechanisms of getting their concerns heard and of persuading the authorities or holding them accountable. In other circumstances, they are viewed as dependent of local landowners, elites, and institutional structure instead of as citizens. Lastly, with regards to women's political participation prospects, there is still another striking disparity between the statutory structure and the *de facto* situation. Although there is a legitimate *quota* of seats for women in politics, these seats sometimes prove to be meaningless in reality. Women are generally sidelined from decision-making or important positions, but when they obtain political positions inside the system of government, it is often because of affinities or family ties with other potent male leaders. Nonetheless, women have begun to be employed within the military organization, which is a breakthrough.

ROLE OF GOVERNANCE IN CONFLICTS

The notion of *government* is as old as human existence on the earth (Imran & Nordin, 2018). It is now frequently employed in many ways to define the decision-making framework and the enforcement of those decisions, such as business ethics, international governance, and national and local governance. Since governance is a practice of policy-making and its enforcement, an analysis of governance places emphasis on the formal and informal players who partake in the policy-making process and in its execution (Weiss, 2000). Good governance is well understood and agreed in relation to the institutional and political processes, as well as with the results that are deemed appropriate to achieve – such as the objectives of prosperity, development, and empowerment. Good governance is an ongoing practice in which public institutions perform a key role, since they handle state resources and so they focus on ensuring the enforcement of fundamental rights without corrupt practices, violence, and exploitation. They would observe the law in ensuring justice and equal opportunities. Their services can be evaluated based on the provision of basic, constitutional, educational, economic, civil, and political rights, if they facilitate access of their residents to the basic resources of life in an effective and transparent manner. Corruption, wasted resources, social inequality, oppression, and violations of the law emerge from the lack of good governance. They all pave the way for social disorder and chaos, which eventually create the foundation for the development of conflicts. In the literature of development, governance and good governance are common concepts. An underlying issue of inequality and injustice in every society is the poor governance. As mentioned by the UN Development Agenda, “Governance relates to the implementation of legal and administrative power to administer the matters of a nation at all stages.” It involves the means, mechanisms, forms, and structures by which individuals communicate their desires, execute their sovereign rights, recognize their responsibilities, and resolve their differences (UN, 2015).

A WAY FORWARD: THE NEED FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE

Pakistan is a country where several areas are plagued by conflicts of various kinds. These conflicts are deeply ingrained in the country and are multidimensional. Much of its issues are related to the imperatives of socio-economic power. Despite being internal affairs, they are the outcome of challenges that have gone unanswered since the country’s independence, necessitating the use of economic and political approaches to resolve them. However, other challenges have national and international dimensions. While numerous conflicts have erupted in the country time and again, they have notably escalated since 9/11. These all

have immense internal as well as regional and international implications. This study shows that Pakistan is facing numerous challenges with distinct characteristics, both national and international. Geopolitical, sectarian violence (Shiite and Sunni fundamentalism), religion-based issues, nationalism and racial crimes are the main challenges to the country. The primary reasons that prevail at the national scale are bad governance, an uncertain political landscape, poor democratic systems, ongoing and growing hostility among provinces and various ethnic and minority groups. The need to improve the country's institutional system is an important response emerging from the analysis; it is of uttermost value for its political improvement and economic development. A fair and constructive policy-making mechanism involving all regions and communities of Pakistan must be identified. This may also allow for building consensus on the fair allocation of resources among the provinces of the country.

A major problem in the institutional system of Pakistan is its dependence on feudal / tribal power, leading to an absolute domination by a privileged section of the society. The primary move towards weakening this influence is to introduce market reforms in the country, with no political interference. A core element for tackling potential conflicts is the enforcement of law and order. In improving a society and its power structures, an efficient and open judicial system is of supreme concern. Political parties at the regional and national levels need to take a constructive and pragmatic approach to deal with the crisis situation in Pakistan. The government should include every main political party in the process of building consensus about the different circumstances in various areas of Pakistan. According to the UN report on population expectancy in Pakistan, released by the UN (2015), the country is expecting a shift in its demographics, its population is expected to be over 300 million by 2050 and in no time almost 50 % of the population will shift to urban centres (UN, 2015). The fertility decline, since the 1980s and 1990s, has expanded the pool of opportunity for relatively substantial sections of the working-age population, and especially for young people. Young people are less productive financially, especially in the conflict regions, and their integration into the labour market is not satisfying; instead, the rate of unemployment is particularly alarming in certain regions. Even though the Pakistani government has initiated several policy steps to generate jobs, the concern is if they are sufficient for the time being and also capable of solving all the problems to come or more importantly, if they are sufficient to transform current youth population into a force for the future economic development. The enforcement of several measures does not mean the scores of unskilled, jobless youth could be employed in high skilled areas. The potential of the on-site skill development projects tends to be quite limited to support the increasing proportion of young people. Additionally, basic development and / or construction programs may well not be desirable for the employment of young people, especially those who have 10 or more years of schooling. KPK and Balochistan both present an

incredibly poor picture in terms of job opportunities for youth. Thus far, no special steps have been provided for these two regions. This gives room to the plans of extremists and other interest groups to strengthen their situation in the provinces. Also, there is a deficiency of an effective and organized strategy to realise the demographic dividend. There is a need for a better and close collaboration between the ministries and the administrative and financial structures of all public sectors, a need for a shared agenda, to make the youth an asset for the country.

CONCLUSIONS

The results of this study indicate that Pakistan is facing numerous conflicts due to various local and territorial factors, but there are real causes operating at national level, with bad governance, weak political system, ineffective national institutions, and continued and growing tension between provinces and various ethnic and marginalized populations. In Pakistan, communal violence, as well as party violence is widespread due to political, racial, religious, gender and tribal polarization. The prevailing brutal culture in the region has created a violent series of challenges, demonizing the core of the country. In addition, young people are vulnerable to this growing harm. Some specific brutal and radical organizations representing themselves as the supporters of Islam have emerged in the global environment as a severe risk to the sovereign powers, stability, peace, and integrity of Pakistan. While they are not the true image of Islam and of the majority people in Pakistan, these extremist groups not only deny their own viewpoint, but also render their own ideology totally contradictory to and opposing to the Islamic doctrine and Islamic jurisprudence. Nevertheless, just a small percentage of the population supports and believes in this extremist groups. Nonetheless, religion has seized culture and took control of people in the country. Pakistan also needs to control the propagation of ethnic disparities and violent behaviour, to accept pluralistic values which would trigger changes in social structure, that would ultimately lead to political stabilisation. The democracy-triggered integrity would offer consolation and trust to individuals who see the Federal Government as an oppressive agent or power. The state needs to consider the reality of widely differing individuals not just in papers, but also in practice. But in the Pakistani politics, the basic requirements of democracy were not met yet, which ultimately created a gap for ethnic communities. Thus, the clear and functional democratic system in Pakistan has never gained ground. In addition, multiple social problems such as poverty, lack of education, gender discrimination and feudal system have intensified terrorism and extremism in the country. Also, the rulers of different religious groups are yet to settle their sectarian tensions. They express little interest in addressing their conflicting concerns. Intense affiliation with a single sect and the attempts of the leaders to draw their devotees away from the beliefs, writings

and background of other faiths are major obstacles on the path of peace and reconciliation. The entire social system has been shaken, frightened and traumatized by the target killing and other sectarian-motivated actions. Thus, sectarian violence has become a part of the political paradigm in the country. The nation and the state cannot consider stability until peace is pursued by the different conflicting groups. The federal and provincial governments both need to realize what the actual situation of the country is and then try to formulate a contingency plan to secure harmony in the country. The genuine concerns of people should be answered. The circumstances can never be addressed, and the social order can never be restored, until such meaningful actions are taken.

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